

# **Indonesian Participation in the UN Peacekeeping as an Instrument of Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities**

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## **ABSTRACT**

*This article explores participation in the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operation (PKO) as an instrument of Indonesian foreign policy. This paper will also discuss the challenges and opportunities in enhancing Indonesian participation in the UN PKO. Based on the realistic understanding that participation in peace operations may foster state's national interests, Indonesia has not yet defined a clear direction to guide its position and attitude on this matter. Indonesian Government needs to establish a national policy that promotes the Indonesian national interests in the UN peacekeeping mission. Successful strategy is a long-term process that requires a strategic and holistic approach. To be among top ten troops contributing country in the UN PKO will be a historical journey for Indonesia in the next decades. And establishing a particular White Paper on Participation in International Peacekeeping Mission will be the first important step.*

**Keywords:** *United Nations, peacekeeping, foreign policy.*

*Artikel ini membahas partisipasi dalam Pasukan Penjaga Perdamaian Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa (PBB) sebagai instrumen kebijakan luar negeri Indonesia. Tulisan ini juga akan membahas tantangan dan peluang dalam memperkuat partisipasi Indonesia pada operasi Pasukan Penjaga Perdamaian PBB. Berdasarkan pemahaman realis bahwa partisipasi dalam operasi perdamaian dimaksud dapat memenuhi kepentingan nasional, Indonesia masih belum mendefinisikan suatu arah yang jelas guna memandu posisi dan sikap dalam masalah ini. Strategi yang berhasil adalah suatu proses jangka panjang yang membutuhkan suatu pendekatan yang strategis dan holistik. Menjadi sepuluh besar negara kontributor pasukan pada operasi penjaga perdamaian PBB akan menjadi suatu perjalanan yang bersejarah bagi Indonesia pada dekade-dekade berikutnya. Dan penyusunan suatu Buku Putih Partisipasi pada Misi Penjaga Perdamaian Internasional akan merupakan langkah penting yang pertama.*

**Kata-Kata Kunci:** *Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa, pemeliharaan perdamaian, kebijakan luar negeri.*

The post-Cold War period has been marked by a large increase in the number on United Nations (UN) peace missions. For most of the Cold War era there were no more than five UN Peace Keeping Operation (PKO) missions operating a tone time. By the end of 2013, there were fifteen on current operations worldwide. The total number of personnel on the ground increased drastically from 30 soldiers in 1947 to almost 99,048 uniformed personnel in 2014 (UNDPKO, as of 30 May 2014). Hence peacekeeping has become the key instrument of the UN to maintain world peace and order. Yet, little attention has been given to evaluate why states choose to participate and contribute troops to the UNPKO. The UN includes in its Charter requirements that all states need to commit efforts in order to maintain international peace. Article 43 of the UN Charter states that:

“All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including the rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security”.

Nevertheless, most UN members do not fully meet their obligations, while a minority of states has participated above and beyond the line of duty. Some states contribute financially to support the UNPKO, while other countries provide troops. Though both levels of participation (financial and military) are equally important for the functioning and success of peacekeeping missions, the major burden of carrying out these operations in the field is borne by a small number of troop contributors. Even among those who contributed with soldiers, the commitment differs adversaries considerably. Some commit heavily, whereas others deploy only a hand full of observers, while a majority of states abstain completely from commitment. Some states commit thousands of troops, while other states prefer to free-ride and enjoy the peace without paying the cost. This raises the question of why some states are willing to become regular troop-lending countries (TLC's)/police contributing countries (PCC's), while other states remain reluctant to contribute members of their armed forces to missions directed by the UN.

### **UN Peacekeeping: Definition and Principles**

Peacekeeping is a technique which has been developed, mainly by the UN to help control and resolve armed conflict. The official view in the UN is that the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was the first UN PKO. It consisted of unarmed military observers who were sent to Palestine in June 1948 to supervise a truce negotiated by Count Bernadotte in the first war between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

A major step forward was taken when the first armed UN force – the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) – was deployed in Egypt following the Anglo - French - Israeli attack on that country in October 1956 (Goulding 1993).

The established principles of peacekeeping can be summarized in five principles. *First*, PKOs were UN operations. It was UN which had made UN PKO acceptable to member states who would not otherwise have accepted foreign troops on their territory. *Second*, it had become established over time that PKOs could be set up only with the consent of the parties to the conflict in question. It had also been learnt that they could succeed only with the continuing consent and cooperation of those parties. *Third*, it had been established that the peacekeepers must be impartial between the parties. They were not there to advance the interests of one party against those of the other. The *fourth* principle related to the troops required for the UN PKOs. The UN Charter provided for member states to enter into binding agreements with the Security Council under which they would commit themselves to provide it with troops. The *fifth* principle concerned the use of force. More than half the organization's PKOs before 1988 had consisted only of unarmed military observers. But when operations were armed, it had become an established principle that they should use force only to the minimum extent necessary and that normally fire should be opened only in self-defense.

On the basis of those principles established during the first four decades of the UN PKO, a definition of peacekeeping could perhaps read as follows:

“Field operations established by the United Nations, with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under United Nations command and control, at the expense collectively of the member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by them, acting impartiality between the parties and using force to the minimum extent necessary”.

UN peacekeeping helps countries torn by conflict create conditions for lasting peace. Peacekeeping has proven to be one of the most effective tools available to the UN to assist host countries navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace. Peacekeeping has unique strengths, including legitimacy, burden sharing, and an ability to deploy and sustain troops and police from around the globe, integrating them with civilian peacekeepers to advance multidimensional mandates. UN peacekeepers provide security and the political and peacebuilding support to help countries make the difficult, early transition from conflict to peace. Peacekeeping is flexible and over the past two decades has been deployed in many configurations.

Today's multidimensional PKOs are called upon not only to maintain peace and security, but also to facilitate the political process, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights and assist in restoring the rule of law. Success is never guaranteed, because the UN peacekeeping almost by definition goes to the most physically and politically difficult environments. However, UN peacekeeping has built up a demonstrable record of success over six decades of existence, including winning the Nobel Peace Prize.

### **Indonesian Participation in the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission**

The Indonesian participation in the UN PKOs is based on the Preamble of the Constitution 1945, Foreign Relations Act No. 37/1999, Indonesian Armed Forces Act No. 34/2004, Indonesian State's Police Act No. 2/2002, and State Defense Act No. 3/2002, as well as the UN Charter in maintaining world order and its subsequent UN Resolutions. The Indonesian peacekeeping force (Garuda Contingent) started its first mission in 1957 to Egypt (UNEF) to maintain peace in the Suez Canal and Egyptian-Israeli border. Indonesian Peacekeeping Forces have been working under the UN umbrella, called the "Blue Helmet" throughout the world. They have been stationed from Congo (ONUC) to Lebanon (UNIFIL).

Indonesian participation in UN PKO missions since the beginning has received high praises from a lot of countries for their professionalism and contribution towards the missions. In the 1990's, Indonesia participated in 2 (two) UN PKO missions contributing to the development of peacekeeping missions, namely the UN missions in Namibia and Cambodia, in which for the first time, UN PKO were also mandated to assist in the national elections. In 2000, the number of Indonesian contingent participating in the UN PKO was only 44 personnel. In the last 14 years the numbers have increased in 8 (eight) UN PKO missions to 1,783 personnel in 2014 (UNDPKO, as of 31 May 2014). The UN PKOs have nowadays become an important instrument of Indonesia's independent and active foreign policy.

Indonesia is committed to the principles and objectives enshrined in the UN Charter, in particular maintaining international peace and security. The first Indonesian contingent in the UN PKO was in 1957 when Indonesia sent its troops to the Middle East in keeping the peace in Suez Canal, involving Egypt, Israel, UK and France. Although internationally recognized for its role in various UN PKO activities, the following years,

however, Indonesian participation in the UN PKO had decreases. After Indonesian participation in Cambodia (UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia – UNTAC, early 1990s) and Namibia (UN Transitional Assistance Group – UNTAG, in the late 1980s), the number of personnel sent by Indonesia to participate in the UN PKO was limited, compared to the number of troops sent by South Asian countries which are the largest contributor of troops.

Indonesian more increasing active role in participating its UN PKO was inspired by the experience of the then Brigadier General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono when he was sent to Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995-1996 as the Chief Military Observer as well as the Indonesian contingent leader of military observers in the Konga XIV (UNPROFOR-the UN Protection Force). Although the number was still considered low, Indonesia continued its active participation in the UN PKO after President Yudhoyono started his administration in 2004 by sending 188 members of Indonesian contingent in RD of Congo (MONUC) until 2004. They were mostly from “Engineering Unit and Health Division” and underwent a yearly rotation. Until 2004, Indonesian contingent in the UN PKO were around 201 members, ranking 42 in the world list of the UN PKO countries.

In 2014 (UNDPKO, as of 30 May 2014), Indonesian ranks 19th in the list of world UN PKO contributor, out of 122 countries participating in the UN PKO numbering 1,783 personnel (including 33 female peacekeepers), consists of 3 individual police and 140 formed police units, 19 experts on mission/military observers, and 1,586 contingent troop/military personnel. They are distributed in 8 missions of UN PKO's deployments, mostly in Africa and the Middle East, namely MINURSO (1, Western Sahara), MINUSTAH (154, Haiti), MONUSCO (185, DR of Congo), UNAMID (149, Darfur), UNIFIL (1,287, including 32 female peacekeepers in Lebanon), UNISFA (2, Abyei, Sudan), UNMIL (1, Liberia), and UNMISS (3, Juba, South Sudan).

Increasing Indonesian contribution in the UN PKO is not only in the increasing number of the personnel, but also in the increase of performance unit. In April 2013, Indonesia has sent its naval vessels, namely KRI Diponegoro to join in the Maritime Task Force (MTF) of the UNIFIL, after sending of KRI Diponegoro (April 2009), KRI Kaiseppo (August 2010) and KRI Sultan Iskandar Muda (September 2011), and KRI Hasanudin (May 2012). This deployment is in line with the UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006). Several posts of high ranking officials in UNIFIL have been given to Indonesian personnel, namely Chief of Staff of the Maritime Task Force (MTF) and Deputy Commander Sector East in UNIFIL. Apart from that, Indonesian participation in a UN peace mission in the Americas, namely the UN

Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), signifies Indonesia active roles in its foreign policy. Before, Asia, Africa, and then Europe, had been the traditional area of deployment of the Garuda Contingent. Now, with Indonesia's contribution of military and police personnel in MINUSTAH, the world becomes the theater of deployment for the Garuda Contingent.

To response to the increasing demand by the UN of the need for Indonesian involvements in the UN PKO, the Armed Forces Commander on January 29, 2007, established the Indonesian National Defense Forces Peacekeeping Centre (PMPP-TNI), which has the duties to undertake preparation and training for the Indonesian Army prepared for Military Observers, contingent and the UN PKOs abroad in accordance with the UN standard and relevant UN PKO duties. This Indonesian response to the UN's demand is in line with the approval by the President who stated in his statement for the Indonesian Independence Day addressed on August 14, 2009 saying that "By the end of conflicts and military operations in various places in Indonesia, therefore to maintain international peace is also a training field for the Indonesian armies to strengthen their professionalism to the level of international standards".

The establishment of Indonesian Peacekeeping Mission Coordinating Team (TKMPP) on December 15, 2011, has also shown Indonesia's vision to significantly develop its roles and participations in the peacekeeping operations especially in strengthening the roles of 3 (three) PKO components, namely military, police, and civilian forces. For the military roles, the leading sector for development is the Armed Forces Headquarters namely Indonesian National Defense Forces Peacekeeping Center, whereas police components are conducted by the Police Headquarter. Apart from that, the involvement of civilian experts – which are now being prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) – is more instrumental and in line with the UN missions, in which the multidimensional of PKOs and the rapid deployment standard and on-call civilian experts are more significant.

On December 19, 2011, President Yudhoyono officially announced the opening of a peacekeeping facility as part of the Indonesian Peace and Security Center (IPSC) in Sentul, Bogor. Through the peacekeeping center, Indonesia is expected to employ more peacekeepers with sufficient language proficiency, to develop standby forces and enhance its rapid deployment capacity. The President also underlined the constitutional mandate and the perennial issue of maintaining international peace and security. These are two factors that ensure the persistent relevance and importance of Indonesia's contribution to PKOs, in particular under the UN umbrella. The establishment of IPSC

in Sentul, Bogor, that serves as a military training institutions in order to prepare military personnel to be assigned for the future UN PKO is also an effort of Indonesian government's response to address the challenges faced by the UN PKO in general in order to create capacity building that impact on the implementation of the PKO in the future.

On March 20, 2012, the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon visited the IPSC in Sentul, accompanied by *UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations* Hervé Ladsous. In his remarks, he underscored the appreciation of the establishment of IPSC, appreciation of the Indonesian contribution in its various peacekeeping operations and the hope of more Indonesian participation in sending its personnel as well as its equipment. He also made special remarks about the role that President SBY contributed to enhancing the role of Indonesia initiatives in the UN PKO (Ban Ki Moon 2012). In his response, President Yudhoyono promised a much greater Indonesian contribution to the UN peacekeeping forces with the goal of eventually deploying as many as 10,000 Indonesian peacekeepers to the UN PKO. The President also committed to provide three military transport helicopters to assist with those efforts (Yudhoyono 2012). Meanwhile, the Commander of the Indonesian National Defense Forces Peacekeeping Center, Brigadier General Imam Edy Mulyono in his statement on a Seminar in May 2012 stated that in two years' time (2012-2014), Indonesia will increase its personnel in the UN PKO up to 4,000 peacekeepers and he hoped that Indonesian Officials can eventually hold higher and more important positions in the UN peacekeeping missions (Mulyono 2012). And finally, the Indonesian military's Major General Imam Edy Mulyono, former Commander of the Indonesian Defense Forces Peacekeeping Centre, was appointed Force Commander of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). Leading a multinational peacekeeping mission is a triumphant moment for a country that has been involved in PKOs since 1957.

The ambitious target constitutes the efforts to optimize Indonesian roles in the UN PKO, although, in reality it (the proposed increase in UN PKO contingents) seems to be further considered thoroughly with the list of the UN roster, whether Indonesia is already included in the stand-by force contingent in the UN PKO system. The proposed substantial increase in the UN PKO contingents need to be approved also by the Parliament, before being implemented in a real dispatch in the foreseeable future. The increasing number of Indonesian women participation in the UN PKO as mandated by UN Security Council Resolution No. 1325 of 2000, is also an indication of more active role of recent Indonesian foreign policy.

## **Peacekeeping as an Instrument of Foreign Policy**

Laura Neack identifies two contrasting perspectives to explain why states participate in the UN PKO. On the one hand, the “idealist” perspective assumes that “states will participate in UN PKO out of an obligation to protect international peace and preserve international norms and values” (Neack 1995). The attainment of those norms and values will thus prompt states to participate in peacekeeping even when it is against their own interests. On the other hand, the “realist explanation of state participation in UN PKO is that states do whatever they can, given their power resources, to protect and preserve their national interests” (Neack 1995). According to this explanation, participation in peacekeeping is thus understood primarily as an instrument to foster states’ national interests. Furthermore, in the writing of Catherine Gegout stated that within the realist perspective, national interests are not only defined in terms of “hard” military-security issues, but also in terms of economic interests and even states’ prestige. Hence, realists simply “expect government-defined national interest to take precedence over altruistic humanitarianism” (Gegout 2009).

From a military perspective, such goals are often associated with, among others, guaranteeing states’ own security, testing operational aspects of military doctrines and strategies, forming and instructing national contingents, and guaranteeing their state of preparedness at comparatively low cost. Politically, the involvement in peace operations is usually attached to the goals of increasing states’ international profile, acquiring prestige, interests in their perspective areas of influence or interest, creating or strengthening a status of leadership, fostering opportunities for integration into the “international community”, and creating opportunities for regional/international cooperation – including military aspects (Gill and Huang 2009; Sorenson and Woods 2009; Krishnasamy 2001; Bullion 1997; and Gegout 2009).

Whether explicit or not, Indonesian foreign policy also adopts the realist perspective to explain the Indonesian participation in the UN PKO. Indonesian government adopted participation in peace operations as part of strategy of integration into the international system. Accordingly, the entire situation in which the Indonesian military participated in the UN peacekeeping were said to have occurred in a “context that confirms the effectiveness of the use of military expression as an instrument of Indonesian foreign policy”. In a view, the Indonesian participation in the UN PKO reflects the realistic interpretation, for instance, that “peacekeeping operations should be regarded as an operational category of great utility for Indonesian foreign policy”.

The Indonesian participation in many UN PKOs has also been supported by the same realistic perspective that it will be associated to the quest for a non-permanent seat at the UN Security Council/UNSC (2019-2020). Another views within the same realistic assumption concerning the instrumental use of peacekeeping that the instrumentality of military power for Indonesian foreign policy, that participating effectively in peace operations would intensify the international bargaining power of Indonesia, contribute to the increase of its soft power and could be used as rationale for increasing the resources dedicated to the defense sector.

What most of those views in common is the realist assumption that Indonesian participation in the UN peacekeeping may be (and/or should be) used to advance specific goals and in accordance with the country's national interests – which thus takes precedence over concerns of an “idealist” nature. Hence, Indonesian participation in the UN PKO is often regarded as a response to the broader orientation of Indonesian guidelines at specific times. However, a more critical analysis of Indonesian actual participation in the UN PKOs reveals that Indonesian actions have been marked by some degree of inconsistency over time. According to the analysis proposed here, this is a consequence of the lack of a clear definition of both the parameters and the expected goals of that participation and may affect the Indonesian quest for a more active profile in international peace and security matters.

### **Evolving Approach to Indonesian UN Peacekeeping Mission**

PKOs have become an important instrument of Indonesia's independent and active foreign policy. Its landmark contribution is a series of Garuda Contingents. The idea of a Garuda Contingent is as inventive as the idea of PKOs. In the absence of viability of the concept of collective security as highlighted in the UN Charter in the height of the Cold War in 1950s, UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld came up with an idea of establishing an emergency international UN Force to supervise the cessation of hostilities in the Suez Canal zone. With the authorization of the UN General Assembly, the UNEF was deployed, and marked the beginning of the first generation of UN PKOs. Hammarskjöld regarded Indonesia as an impartial TCC to UNEF. In response to the call for participation in UNEF, the first Garuda Contingent (Garuda Contingent I) was born.

Today, Indonesia's participation in the UN PKOs is entering a new chapter. This is true at least for two reasons. *First*, for the first time in the history of Indonesia's peacekeeping operations, Indonesia contributes its naval vessels as part of the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force (MTF). Indonesia is one of a few countries that support the Lebanese

Navy in monitoring Lebanese territorial waters, securing its coastline and preventing the unauthorized entry of arms or related material by sea into the country. This deployment is in line with the UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006). This adds to the existing size of the Garuda Contingent in UNIFIL that has reached 1,287 peacekeepers -as the largest contingent (Italian peacekeepers is the second largest with 1,107 personnel in Lebanon) (As of 30 May 2014). *Second*, for the first time Indonesia participates in a UN peace mission in the Americas, namely the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Before, Asia and Africa, then Europe, had been the traditional area of deployment of the Garuda Contingent. Now, with Indonesia's contribution of military and police personnel in MINUSTAH, the world becomes the theater of deployment for the Garuda Contingent.

Indonesia currently supports the UN PKO in deploying female peacekeepers in the mission for the last 5 years (2009-2014). There are 33 Indonesian women peacekeepers deployed as of 30 May 2014, namely 1(one) individual police in UNAMID, Sudan, and 32 Indonesian female peacekeepers in UNIFIL, Lebanon.

With the establishment of the peacekeeping center, Indonesia has the opportunity to develop a PKOs capacity that meets the requirements as outlined in the Brahimi reforms of the UN PKOs; to develop a rapid deployment capacity and to fulfill the vision of deploying 4,000 peacekeepers. It is also important that the newly established center includes in its priorities a capacity to contribute a civilian component to a multidimensional peacekeeping mission. This civilian component would comprise legal experts, engineers, accountants, development specialists, public administration experts, electoral specialists, medical doctors, education specialists, and other relevant professionals. And the newly founded peacekeeping center could help the country enlarge its contribution to the UN and other peace missions in the future.

PKOs will continue to be an essential instrument of Indonesian independent and active foreign policy. Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. R.M. Marty Natalegawa in his Annual Press Statement on 7 January 2011 stated that on the issue of PKOs, Indonesia actively contributes to the development of the strategic concept of the deployment of the UN PKOs. Indonesia continues to encourage an increased role for civilians (White Helmets) to support the development and rehabilitation programs in post-conflict areas. Indonesia will strive to become the hub of a network of peacekeeping centers in the region. Indonesia deployed its peacekeepers in the UN missions to fulfill its commitment to the maintenance of world peace. Indonesia is one of the 20 largest contributing countries to the UN peacekeeping forces. Indonesia increased its contributions to peacekeeping not only in terms of number

of personnel but also in terms of additional *performance units*. Indonesian Naval Vessel joined the MTF UNIFIL. In the future, Indonesia will continue to increase its contributions to the UN PKOs to join the top ten largest contributor countries of the UN troops (Natalegawa 2011).

### **Challenges and Opportunities**

Since the Indonesia White Paper on Defense 2008 remains the guiding policy frameworks for the Ministry of Defense (MoD) in Indonesian defense policy, one of the defense strategic interest including world peace and regional stability. Defense cooperation will also include armed forces duty in peacekeeping operations. The White Paper is structured around constitutional imperatives and guided by the Act of Armed Forces No. 34/2004 and State Defense Act No. 3/2002. The White Paper stipulates in Chapter 6 with regard to State Defense Development that Indonesian Armed Forces will fulfil its responsibilities to participate in the international peacekeeping missions. In addition, Armed Forces had also set up Peacekeeping Center in the structure of Armed Forces Headquarter. The White Paper further stated the budget constraints in order to have a Minimum Essential Force (MEF) as well as the available defense budget of below 1% GDP for the last 10 years. This will be a critical challenge not only in Indonesian defense posture, but also in the duty of armed forces in the peacekeeping mission. This implies that the general defense budget will also make provision for peacekeeping missions. As part of national interests, the participation in peacekeeping missions needs a proper readiness in defense sector as well for the next decade.

The principle of shared responsibility of different state ministries to embark on the drafting of a particular White Paper on Participation in International Peacekeeping Mission, in the absence of definite policy guidelines on how to select specific missions to undertake. The aim was to establish a well-defined mandate for dealing with the large number of requests received for Indonesian peacekeeping. This also will be in line with the statement of Indonesian Foreign Minister on January 7, 2011 in his Annual Press Statement that in the future, Indonesia will continue to increase its contributions to the UN PKOs to join the top ten largest contributor countries of the UN troops.

The White Paper on Participation in International Peacekeeping Mission should be tabled in parliament that will serve as a guideline for international peace missions and as a mandate for the armed forces, their requirements and deployment in alignment with UN principles and practices. The said White Paper, together with the White Paper on

Defense 2008 and 2003, will provide the parameters for Indonesian participation in peace missions. Indonesian national interests played a major role in its participation in peace missions. The link between national interests and participation in peace missions should be explained in the White Paper on Participation in International Peacekeeping Mission.

Despite praise for its good intentions, there are practical and policy challenges to the implementation of the White Paper later on. Whether Indonesia overcomes these challenges will depend on the country's ability to elaborate on and develop wide-ranging policy principles, and to institutionalize and endorse the White Paper in the decision-making circuits by operationalizing it in terms of resource and budget allocations, standard operating procedures and national, regional and international cooperation. These challenges can more readily be overcome through joint action by different state ministries, where the key role players are the executive, the legislature, the MoD, the MoFA, and other stakeholders.

The White Paper acknowledged the establishment of the Peacekeeping Mission Coordinating Team chaired by Foreign Minister to act as the national contact point for all international peace mission matters. This coordination will provide better pre-deployment planning, support of media and public interest as well enthusiasm for peace missions. Therefore, peacekeeping operations are to become a key feature of the country's foreign policy. Although participation in the peacekeeping is commendable, it is by nature a costly business. The availability of funds sometimes has a limiting effect on peacekeeping and also on the contributing country. It is argued that the expenditure of sufficiently equipping Indonesian Armed Forces for external peace missions, as well as logistic and deployment costs could be redirected to the socio-economic need of the Indonesian people. Sustaining forces on peace missions is usually a huge financial burden as well as a challenge. Financial shortfalls can hamper military planning, because funds have to be provided from the existing primary role budget, since no additional funds are made available for secondary role.

While the Indonesian Government could stipulate its policy guidelines relating to peacekeeping, it practically compelled the Armed Forces/Police to become involved in peace missions as foreign policy priority. In terms of the White Paper on Participation in International Peacekeeping Mission, and Indonesian White Paper on Defense, PKOs such as these are regarded as secondary functions of the Armed Forces/Police, for which no special structures, training and extra funds are created. Indonesian contribution to peacekeeping missions has not been without physical limitations. As in many military operations,

various factors (such as transport and logistical) create challenges. Indonesia does not have many transport aircrafts/helicopters and the limitation of armament purchases.

The new strategy would be needed to budget for reserve amounts to meet the country's peacekeeping commitments/policies, since Indonesia was still involved in several UN PKOs or its objective in future peacekeeping to be among top ten contributors in the UN PKO. The publication of the Indonesian Defense White Paper 2003 was seen as the first signal of an important step in forging an understanding on the part of the state, and followed by the second White Paper on Defense 2008, particularly by the MoD. This White Paper on Defense provided guidelines for administering the defense function of the Republic of Indonesia. It fundamentally incorporated stated defense policies in carrying out defense functions in the future. The White Paper was also expected to help the government apparatus and the people of Indonesia to better understand defense policies and was essential for Indonesia in maintaining international cooperation. But the said White Paper publications had not explained yet on how the participation in the UN peacekeeping could be used as an instrument of foreign policy in a coherence way.

In general there are various opportunities that support and facilitate in enhancing Indonesian participation in the UN PKOs, such as : leader's vision of the UN peacekeeping; active and leadership role of Indonesia in several international fora and important issues; strong commitment to pay regular contribution to the UN organizations; Indonesian current position in top 20 TCCs in the UN PKO; the increased level of acceptability of other countries towards Indonesian UN peacekeeping troops; Indonesian experiences in the UN PKOs; establishment of IPSC as a network hub for the UN peacekeeping center in the region; Indonesian capability in providing "enablers and multipliers" in the UN PKOs by contributing more transport helicopters, naval ship in maritime task force, and engineering units; contributing more Indonesian female peacekeepers, particularly women police officers in the UN PKO; and the capability of national defense industries such as PT. PINDAD in manufacturing Armored Personnel Carrier (APC 6x6) which can be used by UN mechanized infantry battalion in the UN PKOs as part of developing national strategic industry.

Within and building upon this current situation, the efforts undertaken and opportunities, the challenges related to enhancing Indonesian participation in the UN PKOs, namely :there is no particular White Paper on Participation in International Peacekeeping Mission; lack of adequate institutional capacity; lack of adequate human resources as TCC's/PCC's; limited support to deploy women peacekeepers; lack of

inter-agency coordination; there is no systemized mechanism; lack of funding; lack of integrated policy in developing national strategic industry; and limited support in providing “enablers and multipliers” in the UN PKO mission.

The role of President Yudhoyono in promoting Indonesian participation in the UN PKO for the last 10 years (2004-2014) is very crucial. It is now timely within the context of Indonesian foreign policy that Indonesia will have particular White Paper on Participation in International Peacekeeping Mission as an instrument of foreign policy. This White Paper will promote initiatives in enhancing Indonesian participation in the UN PKOs. This information will provide further explanation that the White Paper is very crucial in formulating the strategy in Indonesian participation in UN PKOs an instrument of foreign policy, particularly to be among the Top Ten TCCs in the UN PKOs.

### **Conclusion**

In the ten years of the President Yudhoyono (2004-2014), Indonesian participation has been marked by its increased participation in many UN PKOs. Based on the realistic understanding that participation in peace operations may foster state’s national interests, Indonesia has not yet defined a clear direction to guide its positions and attitudes on this matter. Some might say that this is indeed a deliberate strategy and that participating in UN PKOs on a case-by-case basis is indeed in Indonesia’s national interest. However, in fact, the Indonesian bid for a non-permanent seat on UN Security Council/UNSC (2019-2020). Considering this reasoning, and bearing in mind the current status of an emerging power that has been attributed to Indonesia, it seems likely that the maintenance of such consistent positions in the realm of international security may have a positive impact on Indonesia’s “emergence”. Maintaining inconsistencies of Indonesian participation in the UN PKOs, therefore, may jeopardize Indonesia’s emergence as a great power after President Yudhoyono has left office. Various efforts conducted by the Indonesian government from the establishment of the Indonesian National Defense Forces Peacekeeping Center, the commitment by the Indonesian President to increase the number of Indonesian UN PKO, the establishment of IPSC in Sentul, up to the sending of naval vessels and transport helicopters to the UNIFIL in Lebanon and Darfur in Sudan, are considered significant optimization of Indonesian roles in the UN PKO.

Given the greater military commitment to the UN PKOs, the government has to allocate resources and determine which missions serve a clear national interest and have a definite chance of success. A more

consistent approach to decision-making, deployments and re-deployments will benefit both the Armed Forces and the government. Participation in the UN PKO is an extension of foreign policy and must be coordinated by the relevant ministries. MoFA and MoD have to see these policy updates as a shared responsibility in matters regarding enhancing Indonesian participation in the UN PKOs in the future. When it comes to reasons and methods used to select specific missions, there will be a need of policy guidelines of the White Paper on Participation in International Peacekeeping Mission. Based on the Indonesian participation in the UN PKO in the last 10 years (2004-2014), the reasons for a review of the White Paper on Defense will be as follows. **First**, the increased contribution to PKOs was an indication of a shift in defense policy, since for the foreseeable future participation in UN peacekeeping will continue. **Second**, the simultaneous developments in peacekeeping, including standby force, and also the increasing emphasis on peacekeeping need to be accommodated in policy documents to ensure effective participation in UN missions.

The revision of the White Paper on Defense has to incorporate the concept of development peacekeeping, reflecting the peacekeeping approach entrenched in the Brahimi Report on International Peacekeeping Reform (2000). Robust policy frameworks are required to guide the content and operationalization of Indonesian UN Peacekeeping Diplomacy. The evolving White Paper on the International Peacekeeping Mission, defense, and international relations, will provide for pragmatic implementation instruments. Indonesian foreign, security, and economic objectives must be formulated and implemented holistically in the long-term pursuit of Indonesian development, the keystone of its ambitious international relations posture.

The White Paper on International Peacekeeping Mission is the most important factor that needs to be considered the most. That means the national policy in Indonesian participation in the UN PKO is very crucial in formulating strategy and roles of Indonesian foreign policy in the UN PKO activities. Indonesian Government needs to establish a national policy that promotes the Indonesian national interests in the UN PKO. Successful strategy is a long-term process that requires a strategic and holistic approach. To be among top ten troops contributing country in the UN PKOs will be a historical journey for Indonesia in the next decades. And establishing a particular White Paper on Participation in International Peacekeeping Mission will be the first important step.

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